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ABSTRACT 
Currency risk management practices in Hong Kong^ were 
reviewed from 1980 to 1990. A common strategy was forward 
hedging based either on exchange rate forecast or just 
risk elimination. The recent trend showed increasing use 
of currency options in order to minimize loss. In some 
companies, treasury departments took the roles of hedging 
currency risk as well as speculation for profit. The risk 
of the four major currencies, Deutsche Mark, Japanese Yen, 
Sterling Pound and Swiss Franc, was quantified in terms of 
standard deviation. Correlations were analysed by linear 
coefficients of correlation. Results showed that for 
dollar based region like Hong Kong, the highest risk had 
been associated with Yen since 1986. Monthly currency 
risk could be a high of nearly five percent. The 
correlations between different currencies had been 
declining since 1988. Economic models were limited in 
predictive power. No consistent accuracy was evident for 
various models. Exchange rates were not tethered by 
Purchasing Power Parity. The role of technical analysis 
was formally analysed by the concept of Near-Rationality. 
Results showed that in the short run (less than a year), 
technical analysis was helpful in a highly uncertain 
world. The technical indicators provided the function of 
anchor for forecasting future exchange rate direction. 
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However, the usefulness of technical analysis in long term 
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The eighties has been an era of globalization. By 
this term, the writer means the international integration 
of various national product markets, factor markets and 
capital markets. It causes one to visualize firms 
obtaining raw materials from one national market, and 
financial capital from another, producing goods with 
labour and capital equipment in a third and selling the 
finished product in yet other national markets. Direct 
investments by multi-national corporations have 
contributed to globalization of product and factor 
markets. The increasing mobility of capital contributes 
to the globalization of financial, markets. During the 
ten-year period ending in 1988, Americans increased their 
investment overseas by about 180 percent. During the same 
period, foreigners increased their investment in the U.S. 
by about 380 percent. At the end of 1988, foreign assets 
in the U.S. totalled $1,786 billion, of this, $329 billion 
was direct investment. Most of the remainder was 
invested in financial assets.^ 
iResnick, Bruce G., "The Globalization of World 
Financial Markets", Business Horizons (Nov—Dec 1989): 34 . 
2 
� The globalization takes place under the flexible 
exchange rate system which has been practised since the 
abandon of Bretton Wood System in 1971. This system was 
expected to reduce balance of payment constraints and 
provide the monetary authorities of major countries with 
more independence in the conduct of policy than had 
existed previously. 
Cash Flow Destablization Due to 
‘ Floating Exchange Rate 
The growing ability of multi-national corporations to 
capture market share in foreign product markets and to 
finance its international operations from various money 
centers means that the corporate profits are much affected 
by movement in exchange rates. A portfolio manager 
invests in foreign equity markets in order to diversify 
the portfolio only to find that the portfolio is subjected 
to large currency risks. A Japanese life insurance 
company invests in U.S. treasury bond, for example, finds 
that the cash flow from holding the bond is destabilized 
by the fluctuation of dollar against Yen exchange rate. 
Globalization provides many more worldwide opportunities 
to make money as well as to lose. 
Role of Currency Risk Management in the Past 
In the past, central focus of interest for currency 
2 
risk management was exchange rate forecast • Under the 
^See Madura (1986). 
3 
fixed exchange rate system predicting changes from one 
exchange rate to another was quite possible. The official 
exchange rate was an anchor for expectation. Any 
pressures built up to force a government to devalue or 
revalue a currency could be tracked basing on economic 
fundamentals. However, the forces causing free market 
exchange rate movements in the flexible exchange rate 
systems were much less discernible. The predictability of 
various economic models was under serious challenges^� 
4 
According to Craig Hakkio , the large swing and high 
volatility of dollar exchange rate in the 1980s was not 
unusual. Because Hong Kong dollar had been pegged .to U.S. 
dollar since October 1983, Hong Kong exporters and 
importers had to deal with this volatility as well. The 
large short term variability of exchange rate opened the 
potential to make short-run windfall gains by currency 
speculation and created the pressure to avoid short-run 
losses on the carrying value of assets. Thus, the 
currency risk management was biased to short-run basis. 
Changes Perceived in the Future 
For the years to come in the nineties, an investor or 
manager has to face a lot more uncertainties than in the 
^The weakness of models will be discussed in later 
Chapters. 
4 Hakkio, Graig S. "Exchange Rates in 1980s. Research 
Division", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1989• 
-m 
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eighties. First, economic growth and inflation level of 
major industrial countries can be diverging in contrast to 
the convergence led by U.S. economic growth in the past. 
Second, the level of globalization will be ever 
increasing. The barriers created by protectionism will 
accelerate the direct investments of multi-national firms 
in foreign countries. Third, expectation and news make 
the exchange rates more and more difficult to forecast^. 
Thus how currency risk is managed will be an increasingly 
important topic to international firms and investors. 
Scope of the Study 
The paper plans to cover the following : 
1. Definition of currency risks. 
2. Why currency risks arise. 
3. Measurement of currency risks and coefficients of 
correlation. 
4. Weakness of economic models. 
5. The role of technical analysis in currency risk 
management and its effectiveness. 
Objectives of the Study 
Foreign Exchange market has become one of the major 
financial markets for investment in Hong Kong while 
international trade continues to be the major impetus for 
growth. The role of currency risk management is highly 
important and relevant to exporters - importers, investors 
^See Copeland (1989). 
5 
and speculators. The writer has surveyed the past MBA 
projects and finds that there was no literature on this 
subject. Therefore the writer would like to undertake a 
study in the area of currency risk management in order to 
achieve the following objectives :-
(1) To review the history of currency risk management in 
Hong Kong. 
(2) To quantify the risks of major currencies and analyse 
their correlations. 
(3) To assess the value and function of technical 
analysis in currency risk management� ：、 
It is expected that the findings of the study can 






The theoretical content of this study is mainly 
derived from the literature related to currency risk 
management, which will be supplemented by real life 
experience obtained from interviews with fund managers and 
treasurers. The empirical part of the study will rely on 
time series study on currency risks, correlations and 
technical analysis. 
Data Used in the Study 
The data sources come from Reuters and Telerate 
which provide daily and monthly exchange rates. The 
target currencies will include Deutsche Mark, Sterling 
Pound, Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc. They are chosen 
because these, currencies are internationally traded with 
high liquidity. They also represent the currencies of the 
major trade partners of Hong Kong. 
Time Covered by the Study 
The study of currency risk and correlation covers the 
period from 1980-1990. This involves a lot of work on 
-m 
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calculations. Due to time limitation, the empirical test 




The measurement of currency risk would use the 
standard deviation method : 
S = A(X - X)^ 
/V N 
where X is the % change period to period 
X is the average % change in one period 
N is the number of periods 
Linear Correlation 
The analysis of correlation coefficient is based on the 
method of linear correlation^: 
SX. Y. 
where r is the coefficient of correlation of the 
two series X and Y. 
X^ is the difference between the ith item and 
the mean X in series X. 
Y. is the difference between the ith item and 1 
the mean Y in series Y� 




Technical analysis involves use of historical price 
data and volume movements exclusively to predict future 
n 
values • It totally ignores economic and political 
factors. There are two primary methods of technical 
analysis : charting and trend analysis. Charting is 
conducted in a judgemental manner where no statistical 
analysis is applied. Chartists examine bar chart to find 
recurring price patterns and then issue buy or sell 
recommendations if prices divert from their past pattern. 
Trend analysis seeks to identify price trends via 
statistical method. The objective is to determine whether 
particular price trends will continue or shift direction. 
The study in this paper uses primarily the trend analysis 
method relying on technical indicators. 
1. Relative Strength Index (RSI) 
The equation for the Relative Strength Index RSI is s 
100 
RSI = 100 - 1+RS 
where RS is defined as •  
No. of business day‘s Up Average = X 
No. of business day's Down Average Y 
The equation can be rearranged as follows : 
100 
RSI = 100 - ( T+X ) 
Y 
(丄） =100 ^X+Y ) 
= No. of business day's Up Average x 100 
(No. of business day's Up Average 
+No. of business day's Down Average) 
^See Murphy Jr. (1986). 
.s 
9 
Therefore, RSI is the portion of upward movement with 
respect to the absolute total movement. 
2• Moving Averages 
A moving average attempts to tone down the 
fluctuations of prices into a smoothed trend so that 
distortions are reduced to a minimum. A simple 
moving average is constructed by totalling a set of 
data and dividing that total by the number of 
observations. 
The formula for a 9-day moving average 
=(Pt+Pt-l+Pt-2+Pt-3+Pt-4+Pt-5+Pt-6+Pt-7+Pt-8) + 9 
3. Oscillator 
An oscillator is traditionally used to measure the 
difference between one fast and one slow moving 
average. The resulting positive or negative value 
allows one to identify the turning point of an 
existing trend. If the fast moving average is larger 
than the slow moving average, the resulting 
difference is positive and thus represents a uptrend. 
If the difference turns from positive to negative it 
means a reverse of uptrend and a sell signal is 
given. If the difference turns from negative to 
positive it means a reverse of downtrend and buy 
signal is issued. 
The formula of oscillator : 




Fundamental analysis is the most common approach to 
p 
forecast future exchange rates . It relies on examination 
of the macroeconomic variables and policies that are 
likely to influence on the prospects of currency. 
Economic models are constructed to forecast direction of 
change. The variables examined include relative inflation 
and interest rate, national income growth and changes in 
money supplies. From a judgemental perspective, a 
forecast arises from a subjective assessment of the degree 
by which general movements in economic variables in one 
country would affect exchange rate. From a statistical 
perspective or econometric approach, a forecast would be 
based on quantitatively measured impacts of factors on 
exchange rates. Fundamental analysis used in this paper 
is based on the following economic models. 
1• Flexible Price Monetary Model 
Assumptions : 
(i) There is no risk premium for currencies and 
hence open interest parity holds.^ 
(ii) Purchasing Power Parity holds and implies real 
exchange rate is expected to remain 
unchanged.^^ 
o See Madura (1986)• 
9 
See De Gauwe (1989). 
lOsee Copeland (1989). 
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(iii) Prices are flexible sufficiently to ensure 
money market equilibrium. 
Predictions : 
(i) Any money market disequilibrium is eliminated 
by an adjustment of demand in response to 
changes in prices. 
(ii) An increase in domestic money supply implies 
higher inflation and that exchange rate 
depreciates in the same proportion. 
(iii) An increase is domestic interest rates implies 
a lower demand for, and excess supply for 
money. Equilibrium requires price to rise and 
hence exchange rate to fall. 
(iv) An increase in domestic real income should 
cause the exchange rate to appreciate through 
an increase in demand for money. 
(V) Value of domestic currency will be negatively 
associated with the interest differential in 
its favour. 
(vi) Factors which do not affect the supply or 
demand for money at home or abroad do not 
affect the external values of the domestic 
currency. 
2• Sticky Price Dornbusch Model 
Assumptions : 
(i) There is no risk premium and thus open 
interest parity holds. 
12 
(ii) Prices are not sufficiently flexible to 
maintain money market equilibrium in short run 
but able to adjust to maintain long run 
equilibrium. 
(iii) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) does not hold in 
short run but holds in long run. 
(iv) Rational expectation of future exchange rate 
based on open interest parity exists . U 
Predictions : 
(i) An increase in domestic money supply will, in 
the long run, have consequences similar to 
those predicted by the flexible price monetary 
model: domestic price will be proportionately 
higher and exchange rate must be 
proportionately lower. 
(ii) In long run. Purchasing Power Parity holds. 
(iii) In short run, domestic interest rate has to 
fall for the larger money stock to be 
willingly held due to sticky price. 
(iv) Exchange rate overshoots to a lower level than 
the long run equilibrium as interest rate 
drops in short run. 
(V) Excess demand for goods will cause higher 
inflation. Higher prices put upward pressure 
on the interest rate which thus begins to 
return to its original level. 
llsee De Gauwe (1989). 
13 
(vi) As interest rate increases, the exchange rate 
rises towards its long run equilibrium. 
(vii) The exchange drate and domestic interest are 
positively associated. 
3 • Portfolio Balance Model 
Assumptions : 
(i) Currencies are not perfect substitutes. Risk 
premium exists and hence open interest parity 
12 
does not hold. 
(ii) Purchasing Power Parity needs not to hold. 
Real exchange rate can change with purely 
monetary disturbances. 
(iii) Changes in the foreign asset position of a 
country are equal to the current account of 
the country assumed there is no government 
intervention. 
(iv) Current account is sluggish and prices are 
sticky in short run • Exchange rate and 
interest rate will have to adjust to clear the 
asset market disequilibrium. 
Predictions: 
(i) An increase in money supply lowers the 
domestic interest rate. 
(ii) Yield on holding domestic assets is lower than 
foreign assets. 
l^See De Gauwe (1989). 
14 
(iii) Domestic currency has to depreciate to clear 
the excess demand for foreign assets. 
(iv) Risk premium is required to hold domestic 
currency and hence depreciation of domestic 
currency overshoot to a lower than long run 
equilibrium level. 
(V) The depreciation of currency will then start a 
dynamic process to improve current account and 
hence increase the supply of foreign assets. 
(vi) Current account is positively associated with 
the external account improves the domestic 
currency apppreciates • 、： 
(vii) Nominal and real exchange rates will be 
correlated in the short run because exchange 
rate reacts much faster than price level. 
(viii) The real exchange rate in the final 
equilibrium should be higher than it was 
initially, and the competitiveness of the 
country has eroded although the current 




DEFINITION OF CURRENCY RISKS 
13 
Enzio Von Pfeil classified currency risks into two 
broad categories: non-recurring and recurring. The main 
rationale is to determine which cash flows of a firm are 
affected by exchange rate movements on a short run, or 
long term basis. 
Non-Recurrinq 
One-Off 
One-off risk is cash flow destablization directly 
attributable to exchange rate movements of infrequently 
used currencies. The characteristics of such risks are: 
n 
1. The currency is one which company is not normally 
involved with. This risk cannot be permanent or 
regular. For instance, a one-time transaction in 
Thai Baht. 
2. Involvement in such foreign currency usually involves 
major purchases or sales. These are often for major 
plant and equipments transactions. 
^^See Von Pfeil ( 1988) • 
16 
3. The risk is clearly of explicit nature. The overt 
exchange of currencies is involved. 
4. Exchange rate levels are crucial for controlling this 
type of risk. 
Dealing Risk 
When a firm regards the exchange risks as short term 
risks which must be dealt with on a best effort basis, the 
firm is facing dealing risk. It is thus forced to use 
forecasts which ultimately are dependent on prevailing 
rate levels. The company will tackle the problem by 
obtaining the best rate possible in the circumstances. 
Most treasurers of the corporations are handling this type 
of risk. They talk with the corporate dealers of banks 
about short term movement of currencies and the use of 
forwards, options or futures to lock in the 'best' price 
they forecast. The main trait of a dealing risk is that 
it is based on the misconceptions by management. Actually 
the firm can better handle dealing risk if they accurately 
anticipate the long term nature of the risk. Instead of 
slicing some long term risks into short term pieces, the 
company should use some long term control measures instead 




Financial Structural Risk 
A financial structural risk is cash flow 
destablization directly attributable to exchange rate 
movements arising from a company‘s currency composition of 
cash flows. This kind of risk is important to 
multinational firms. For Hong Kong companies which want 
to diversify into overseas market, they may have to face 
this type of risk. As the capital market has been 
globalized in past few years, firm can raise fund in other 
money centers. Some firms may want to finance by low 
interest currency such as Swiss Franc or Japanesa Yen. 
Then they have regular commitment to service the debt in 
foreign currency. If the firms do not have regular 
revenues of the same currency, they will be exposed to 
this recurring risk due to its financial structure. 
The major characteristic of recurring risk is that it 
is permanent, only the alteration of its currency mix will 
effectively solve the problem. For instance, a firm 
raises Japanese Yen debt must expand the Japan market to 
increase Yen revenue for servicing the debt. Financial 
14 
management textbooks treat this kind of risk as 
accounting exposure. The solution involves some kind of 
management of currency risk. 
14 See Madura (1986). 
18 
Business Structural Risk 
This kind of risk is closely related to the price 
sensitivity of the products which the firm sells. 
Whenever the change of exchange rate affects the relative 
prices of products, it becomes a threat to the competitive 
position of the firms. Therefore, business structural 
risk is fundamental to the products or business which the 
company engages in. Financial management textbooks^^ 
treat this kind of risk as economic risk. The solution of 
this type of risk may involve change of production 
location to capture cost advantage and raise 
productivity as well as new promotional strategy to 
expand market and restructuring.16 
The characteristics of business structural risk are: 
1. The risk is permanent. It is due to the company's 
specific product mix, product age, the location in 
which the firm's business is threatened. 
2. The risk can be explicit or implicit. The role of 
exchange rate swings is either obvious or needs some 
more subtle analysis. 
3. Business structural risk is in many instances 
responsible for a company's cash flows being affected 
by exchange rate flunctuations. 
15see Shapiro (1989). 
l^See Enderwick ( 1989). 
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CHAPTER IV 
WHY CURRENCY RISKS ARISE 
The root cause of currency risks is analysed from two 
angles. One is from household or individual. The other 
is from firm position. 
Individual or Household 
Investment/Speculation 
In the last few years, it has been quite popular for 
Hong Kong citizens to invest in currency market'. They 
either speculate through margin trading or hold foreign-
currency fixed deposits as a kind of investment. They 
are involved in currency risk directly as they 
deliberately hold foreign currencies. The flunctuation of 
exchange rates affects their wealth. Some people are 
exposed to currency risk as they hold foreign assets such 
as bond or stocks. The cash flows from these foreign 
assets become less stable as foreign exchange rates 
flunctuate. 
Overseas Commitment 
Some Hong Kong citizens have family members overseas. 
The size of this population is expected to increase due to 
the 1997 issue. They may have to support their family 
香 f 中 丈 大 學 M f f S 板 g I 
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members overseas or depend on the overseas remittances. 
Any currency flunctuation will affect their cash flow or 
disposable income. 
Corporation or Firm 
Corporate currency risks arise directly or indirectly 
from exchange rate flunctuation. 
Risks Indirectly Associated with Foreign Exchange 
1• Input Output Mix 
For Hong Kong importers of foreign 
differentiated parts for assembling or production, 
the price elasticity of these products are low. An 
electronic factory which has to depend on Japanese 
parts, for example, any Yen appreciation will 
increase the cost of production. However, the low 
price elasticity and the weak buying position force 
the firms to accept the higher Hong Kong dollar 
price. On the sales side of the profit equation, the 
more price sensitive a product is, the more its 
demand decreases as its price rises. A good example 
of proneness to currency risk is American car 
manufacturers. Those companies producing fairly 
replaceable cars have been particularly affected by 
the Japanese who have been making penetrations into 
U.S. market in early eighties. During the period of 
strong dollar in early eighties, the Japanese have 
tended to keep their Yen prices constant and have 
21 
lowered their dollar prices in tandem with a falling 
Yen exchange rate. This increased the price 
sensitivity of the local American cars. The strong 
dollar has weakened the competitive position of U.S. 
cars although exchange rate did not affect their cost 
of production directly. 
For companies that import differentiated 
products and/or sell undifferentiated product, low 
price elasticity as a result of the low substitut-
ability will make them prone to currency risk. The 
risk indirectly exerts impact on the selling and 
buying position of the firms and thus the corgiorate 
profitability. On the other hand, if the companies 
sells differentiated product, unfavourable foreign 
exchange movement cannot affect much on sales 
revenue. For example, a German machine producer can 
raise the HK dollar selling price on a strong 
Deutsche Mark if the machine is differentiated that 
Hong Kong importers must use them for production. 
Therefore the imput output mix of a firm will 
determine the currency risk vulnerability of a firm. 
2• Product Age 
Another industrial root cause of a company's 
currency risk is the age of its products. Suppose a 
domestically invented product is successfully sold in 
the local market and then exported. When its export 
position is threatened, the company begins to 
manufacture the product abroad to take advantage of 
� lower cost of production. If the product remains 
22 
unaltered, it ultimately dies since it fails to 
generate foreign demand. 
A mature product can be easily imitated by 
foreign rivals with cost advantages. The firm is 
becoming increasingly exposed to foreign competitors 
and thus to currency risks. When a particular 
product becomes more price sensitive, its sales are 
becoming increasingly a function of exchange rate 
movements. This is true for revenues generated in 
both local and overseas markets. 
3• Organisational Structure ’ 
For multinational firms with subsidiaries around 
the world, the way they manage currencies will be one 
root cause of currency risk. If every subsidiary 
handles its finance separately, there might be net 
short currency position in one place and the other 
net long currency position in the other location. 
For instance, if one subsidiary constantly sells 
Japanese Yen and buy dollars, and another subsidiary 
constantly buys Japanese Yen and sells dollars, the 
company will be losing money due to the spread 
between buying and selling price. The currency 
management method of the company therefore 
depends on the risk the company is exposed to. The 
solution will be integration and coordination of the 
financial management structure. 
-m 
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Risks Directly Associated with Foreign Exchange 
Currency Mix 
One major occurrence of currency risk is where an 
inflow of one particular currency exceeds an outflow of 
the same currency. The company is said to be structurally 
short or long of a particular currency. For instance, a 
Hong Kong TV wholesaler has to import Japanese TV, the 
invoices are billed in Yen. Since the wholesaler earns 
Hong Kong dollar, there is no Yen cash inflow to cover the 
Yen outflow. Thus he is structurally short of Yen and 
exposed to the Yen exchange risk. On the other hand, a 
garment factory which produces fashions exclusively for 
European markets will receive sales revenues in foreign 
currencies. The cash inflow is destablized by any 
exchange rate flunctuations. Hence, the company should be 
aware of its currency position, and deal with the exchange 




CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT IN 80'S - A RETROSPECT 
Change of Sophistication 
In order to understand how currency risk management 
evolves in the eighties, the writer has interviewed some 
experienced professionals in the treasury departments of 
major foreign banks and local PRC banks as well as fund 
managers of foreign investment houses. The degree of 
sophistication of currency risk management is analysed by 
different periods. 
1980 - 1984 
First of all, let us look at Appendixes I and 工工 to 
see the total turnovers and breakdowns of foreign exchange 
transactions in the United States. Since dollar was the 
reserve currency, foreign exchange transactions in U.S. 
represented the major share of the market. The sample 
surveys by Federal Reserve Bank of New York showed that 
total turnover in one month was 449.7 billions and 615 
billions in 1980 and 1983 respectively. The major 
currencies traded against dollar were Deutsche Mark, 
Sterling Pound and Swiss Franc. Japanese Yen started to 
gain importance in 1983. Minor currencies comprised a 
very small portion of the total. In this period, the 
25 
degree of internationalization of Hong Kong started to 
increase. The major foreign trade partner was United 
States. Therefore foreign exchange exposures were mainly 
dollar risk. The movement of Hong Kong dollar against U.S. 
dollar exceeded 10% in 1982 and 1983.^"^ Foreign exchange 
transactions were mainly trade related. Quotes for foreign 
currencies in the interbank market were made in terms of 
US$100,000 and were mainly transacted by European based 
companies in Hong Kong, Quotes for Hong Kong dollar were 
good for US$1 million (nowadays quotes by foreign and local 
major banks are good for amount of US$10 millions). There 
were no sophisidated procedures to handle foreign exchange 
risk. All the exposures were managed on cover basis. 
Forward contracts were used as the primary instrument to 
hedge currency risk. 
After the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the U.S. 
dollar in October 1983, its trading died down. Hong Kong 
became a dollar based region. Hong Kong dollar basically 
floated in the same magnitude as the U.S. dollar against 
other currencies. As there was no exchange control in Hong 
Kong, the trading volume of other foreign currencies 
,. 18 
increased to replace the Hong Kong dollar trading. 
Hong Kong became a major trading centre in Far East. 
Treasury operation became major source of revenue for banks 
17 See Appendix 3. 
18information was supplied by Mr. Y. L. Tang, former 
Treasurer of Bank of Communications. No definite figures 
could be found for that period. 
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� apart from traditional credit business. In order to 
increase profitability, banks engaged in trading major 
currencies against U.S. dollar as profit margin in loan 
business dropped due to competition and cost of 
1 Q operation. During this period, dollar was strong because 
of the tight monetary policy of Federal Reserve which was 
20 
chaired by Paul Volcker. Currency risk management was 
mainly to cover short dollar positions as dollar was almost 
one way up. For importers the risk was highei: than that of 
exporters who received in U.S. dollar from foreign trade. 
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 7 二 
The U.S. dollar uptrend became shaky in the beginning 
of 1985 as the trade and budget deficits continued to 
increase. In September 1985, the heads of the seven 
industralized countries (G7) namely the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, France, Canada and 
Italy met in Plaza Hotel in New York to discuss the 
economic problems. They came up with the Plaza Accord to 
force dollar lower in order to correct the trade imbalance 
and to emphasize coordination of economic policies. 
Central banks started to sell dollar in open market and 
dollar fell sharply. The intervention was backed by an 
21 easier U.S. monetary policy. From that time onward, 
19 Annual Report, J.P. Morgan & Co., 1985. 
20 
See Shapiro (1989). 
21see Shapiro (1989)• 
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� currency risk control was a synonym as ‘sale of dollar‘. 
For those dollar based corporations and investors, holding 
currencies other than dollar brought windfall gain. 
Corporations with foreign currencies fund flow always 
hedged by forward sale of dollar. For fund managers 
diversification outside U.S. asset markets was an effective 
means to increase return. Large size corporations used 
their own treasuries to manage fund flow and make profit by 
22 
speculating on dollar. Forward contract became the means 
to speculate apart from hedging. Other instruments such as 
futures and options were brought in by U.S. banks. During 
this period, exchange risk control was not a big deal as 
dollar trend must be down in everybody's mind. The reality 
behaved that way. Everybody was happy as they made 
handsome profit by selling dollar. Foreign deposits in 
Hong Kong increased dramatically and surpassed the growth 
23 
rate and absolute size of Hong Kong dollar deposits. Of 
course, the 1997 issue also contributed to this increase• 
Global foreign exchange transactions increased explosively. 
Average global daily volume in 1987 was estimated at $425 




For example, the Worldwide Group of Hong Kong has 
treasury department to generate profits by investing in fin ncial markets including foreign exchange.23See Hang Se g Eco omic Monthly, Feb 1986. OA Resnick (1989) P.40. 
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1988 - 1990 
After the stock crash in October 1987, central banks 
became aware that coordination of monetary policy was 
important to financial stability. Interest war among G7 
countries started the fall of stock market although program 
trading did worsen the situation. The dollar collapse 
after the stock crash also made the central banks worry 
about a free fall. G7 countries began to enforce the 
Lourve Accord reached in February 1987 to support U.S. 
25 
dollar and emphasize price stability. Economic agents 
were puzzled about the direction of dollar. Poor 
fundamentals such as widening trade deficits and budget 
deficits argued for a lower dollar. However, central banks 
bought dollar to prevent further weakness. The signal 
given to the public was that the U.S. government had had 
enough depreciation of dollar. The dollar should move 
within a range defined by central banks. Intervention 
would be used to guard against movements out of this 
reference band. Central bankers did not explicitly specify 
the reference band in order to avoid distorting market 
force. Foreign exchange traders had to rely on monthly 
economic data for short term dollar direction. Movements 
2 fi 
were choppy and sometimes irrational. However swings 
were getting smaller. Trading in Far East became more 
orderly in contrast to the volatile market in 1985 - 1987. 
^^See Shapiro (1989). 
26 Irrational in the sense that economic agents do not 
respond to all available information. It can also be the 
near-rational response as discussed in Chapter VI. 
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Currency risk control became a headache to company 
treasurer or financial controller. In contrast to the 
monotonic trends in the previous two periods, the U.S. 
dollar, affected by economic or political news from time to 
time, fluctuated more randomly. Big loss from forward 
hedging was not unusual. Currency consultancy became very-
popular and hot business although the fee charged was very 
expensive compared to the true benefits from the advices. 
Individual currency movement could be very different 
in contrast to the high correlations in 1985 - 1988.^^ 
Major currencies did not always move in tandem due to 
different growth cycle and different monetary policy. Use 
of options became more widespread due to the limited risk 
characteristics of this instrument. Financial management 
of accounting and economic risks became a more and more 
important issue although it was more applicable to 
multinational firms and large companies. 
14 Please refer to next Section for details. 
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Currency Characteristics and Correlations 
As mentioned in Chapter II, standard deviation is 
used to measure risk. It indicates by how much exchange 
rate flunctuates about the average. 
The standard deviation formula is 
S = /s(x - X) 
/V N 
The following is an example of standard deviation 
work table. 
Absolute Average 一 Square of the 
Month % Change(x) % Change(x) Difference 
(X - x) 
Jan-Feb -1.95 -0.11 3.39 
Feb-Mar -1.15 -0.11 1.08 
Mar-Apr 2.77 -0.11 8-29 
12.76 
S = yi2.76 = 2.06 
The coefficient of correlation is based on the 
formular 
r = 2XY 
/ ~ 2 
) (SY ) 
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The following is an example of correlation 
coefficient work table. 
Coefficient of correlation work table 
Month X(^DM) Y(^YN) X = X-X Y = Y-Y X^ Y^ XY 
Jan-Feb -0.63 -1.95 -1.07 -1.84 1.14 3.39 1.97 
Feb-Mar -5.07 -1.15 -5.51 -1.04 30.36 1.08 5.73 
Mar-Apr 7.03 2.77 6.59 2.88 43.43 8.29 18.98 
74.93 12.76 26.58 
r = 2 6 . 6 8 广二 
y(74.93)(12.76) 
= 0 . 8 6 
Findings 
US Dollar 
Standard deviations showed in Table 1 indicated that 
the riskest currency for dollar based firms or individuals 
was Swiss Franc for period 1980 - 1985. The Japanese Yen 
was the lowest risk currency. This was due to the lower 
degree of internationalization of Yen currency and 
government control of foreign exchange« However after the 
Plaza accord in 1985, dollar risk increased. The risk 
level peaked in 1986 - one year after the Plaza Accord. In 
particular. Yen was forced to appreciate to correct the 
huge trade surplus against the U.S. In the five year 
s 
period of 1986 - 1990, Japanese Yen took the place of 
N. 
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Swiss Franc to become the riskiest currency. The 
interesting point in this five year period was that risk of 
dollar against Deustche Mark, Swiss Franc and Sterling 
Pound dropped steadily while the risk level of Yen remained 
steady. The risk level reached a low in 1990. This was 
consistent with the G7 central banks' policy of price 
stability. 
The study helped the firms to understand the exchange 
risk involved in choosing the currency for financing. From 
1980 to 1985, Swiss Franc represented the highest risk and 
Yen the lowest. Any financing of Swiss Franc should 
consider the trade off between high exchange risk 糾ci low 
interest cost. Exposure of Swiss Franc must be carefully 
handled. Another important facet of currency selection had 
to do with how various exchange rates moved in terms of one 
base. Coefficient correlation can show the relative pace 
of change for different currency in terms of one base. 
From Table 2, we saw that the correlation between 
various currency increased throughout the year from 1980 to 
1988 and reached a peak in 1988. The Deustche Mark and 
Swiss Franc remained highly correlated for most of the 
eleven years. Correlation has been as high as 0.98. This 
meant that a dollar based firm had a net short position in 
Swiss Franc could be hedged by long Mark position as well. 
Correlations between the major currencies have been quite 
high from 1985 to 1989. This was attributable to central 
banks‘ weak dollar policy. All currencies appreciated in 
tandem against dollar. 
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However, the fall of correlation in 1990 was quite 
alarming. Even the Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc 
correlation fell to 0.47. This represented that hedging 
Mark risk by Swiss Franc was no longer effective. The 
underlying reason was the divergence of economic growth and 
hence monetary policy. 
Sterling Pound 
In terms of standard deviations shown in Table 3, the 
riskiest currency for Sterling based firms was Japanese Yen 
in the period of 1980 to 1985. Yen risk then dropped in 
the second half of the eighties. Dollar took the place to 
have the highest risk. Actually the dollar risk remained 
high while the risk levels of Deutsche Mark, Swiss Franc 
and Japanese Yen showed different degrees of decrease 
throughout the eighties. Average risk dropped by 22%, 23% 
and 33% for Deutsche Mark, Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen 
respectively. 
Correlation between dollar and Japanese Yen was not 
significant except for the three years from 1983 to 1985. 
Deutsche Mark and Swiss France demonstrated high 
correlation in movements against Pound throughout the 
eighties. Correlation between Japanese Yen and Swiss 
France was unstable. Significant correlation only existed 
from 1982 to 1985. 
Japanese Yen 
From Table 5, the highest risk of Japanese Yen based 
firms was against the Pound in the period 1980 to 1985. 
Risks of Sterling Pound, Deutsche Mark and Swiss France 
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showed different degree of decrease in second half of the 
eighties. Average risks of period 1985 to 1990 dropped by 
33%, 17% and 21% from those of period 1980 to 1985 for 
Sterling Pound, Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc 
respectively. Dollar was the riskiest currency in period 
1985 to 1990 while the risk level increased as well. 
From Table 6, Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc 
demonstrated significant correlation throughout the 
eighties. Correlation between Sterling Pound and either 
one of the above was not significant. There was no stable 
pattern in the coefficients of correlation between Pound 
and Mark or Swiss Franc. Therefore, Pound movement was 
quite different from the other two European currencies for 
Yen based firms. 
Deutsche Mark 
Table 7 showed risk levels of the three major 
currencies against Deutsche Mark from 1980 to 1990. A 
Deutsche Mark based company had its highest currency risk 
against the dollar exchange rate. This risk of dollar was 
double that of Swiss Franc. The second riskiest currency 
was Yen. The standard deviation indicated that the risk 
levels of the other three major currencies against 
Deutsche Mark were decreasing over time. 
Swiss Franc 
Table 8 shows that exchange rate risks using the 
Swiss Franc as a base. Similar to the Mark, the highest 
currency risk is associated with dollar. The interesting 
point is that only the dollar risk appeared to be 
-m 
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increasing in period 1980 to 1985 . From 1986 to 1990, 
risk levels generally decreased among all major 
currencies. 
Weakness of Economic Models 
Using the economic models described in Chapter II to 
analyse the exchange rate movements in the eighties, the 
writer finds some weakness about the various models. 
No Stable Relationship Between Current 
Account and Exchange Rate 
The economic models such as Portfolio Balance—"Model 
and Traditional Flow Model which analyse the interaction 
of current account balance and exchange rate cannot 
explain the reality. The U.S. dollar appreciated while 
the current account was deterioating in 1980 - 1985. 
Another recent example was the strength of Canadian dollar 
in 1989 一 1990 with a worsening current account deficit. 
Positive Relation Between Interest 
Rate and Exchange Rate 
The facts that currency always appreciates with 
higher real interest rate defeat the models that predict a 
depreciation of currency with high interest rate. These 
models are flexible price monetary model and the theory of 
Uncovered Interest Parity. 
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Protracted Long Run Movements of 
Real Exchange Rate 
The sticky Price Dornbusch Model that can explain for 
the short term variability of the exchange rate does not 
yet explain the long swings in the real exchange rates. 
These movements have exhibited cycles of very long and 
unequal duration which have been longer than a typical 
business cycle. Price cannot adjust back to equilbrium 




ROLE OF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS IN CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
The possibility that technical analysis can be used 
to forecast future exchange rate is regarded inconsistent 
2 8 
with the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Never-
theless, technical analysis has become a widely used 
practice in forecasting exchange rates. The concept of 
near-rationality may give some explanations on its ground. 
Concept of Near-Rationality 




EU = (1/2R5 ) (S* - Sq) (1) 
where S* is the mean of a normally distributed future 
exchange rate 
2 
"S is the variance of the normal distribution. 
R is the degree of absolute risk aversion. 
Sq is the current exchange rate. 
theory of semi-strong form efficiency says that 
the current market price reflects all the publicly 
available information. 
^^See De Grauwe ( 1989) P.161. 
-m 
38 
A first characteristic of function EU is its 
non-linearity (refer to Appendix 4) . As a result, around 
the point where the current rate equals the expected rate 
(S* = Sq) the function is almost flat. 
A second characteristic of the function EU has to do 
with the variance of the estimated exchange rate. When 
this variance increases, EU declines and the function 
becomes flatter around the point S•二 Sq. Thus when the 
precision of the estimation of the future exchange rate 
declines, because of increasing uncertainty, the gains from 
taking a speculative position decline. 
There is a cost in changing the optimal portfolio. 
广， 
It is represented by OA in Appendix 4. If the expected 
rate remains within the boundaries set by S^S^ will not be 
worthwhile to change the portfolio. When the expected 
exchange rate moves within this range, economic agents do 
not act on their views about the future developments of the 
exchange rates. The range S^S^ is called a range of 
‘agnosticism' — in the sense that economic agents distrust 
their view because of the risk involved. It follows that 
when economic agents do not act on their beliefs about the 
future, they are agnostic about the future. When the 
precision of the estimation of the future exchange rate 
declines ( ^  ^  increases), the range of agnosticism 
increases. This is shown by the range S'^S'^. 
When the environment is extremely uncertain, economic 
agents allow themselves to be guided by the initial values 
of the price when deciding on the best price. The initial 
values function as ‘anchors‘ in individuals‘ judgement of 
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optimal exchange rate. In contrast to full optimization 
followed from rational behaviour, economic agents do not 
change their portfolio according to their estimates about 
future optimal exchange rate within the range of 
agnosticism. This behaviour is called near-rational. 
Technical analysis can be considered a set of 
near-rational rules of behaviour. These rules of behaviour 
are ，near-rational• responses of economic agents to the 
fact that economic models do not provide reliable 
information for forecasting the future. 
In the absence of an instrument which will anchor 
individuals' beliefs about the future, technical analysis 
takes over and provides such a function. In other words, 
technical analysis will tend to dominate fundamental 
analysis when it becomes clear that the latter has lost its 
value in anchoring individuals• expectation about the 
future. The following formal treatment on the 
determination of future exchange rate can further explain 
the use of technical analysis. 
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Exchange Rate Determination in Near-Rational World 
Consider the following equation:^^ 
n 
V 
= k (, = oC, St一i) + (1 - k)(S* - St) (2) 
where Cj^  can be a positive, negative or zero coefficient 
S^ is the current exchange rate 
S* is the equilibrium exchange rate 
is the expected rate of change in exchange 
rate. 
The first term of the right hand side of equation (2) 
is the backward-looking rule. The second term in the right 
hand side is the forward looking rule. The weights .given 
to these two expectation components is determined by the 
parameter k. This parameter is itself a function of the 
degree to which the exchange rate deviates from the 
equilibrium. If the exchange rate is within the ‘band of 
agnosticism', k will be close to 1. That is economic 
agents give no weight to fundamentals and underlying 
economic models. The backward-looking rule dominates 
expectations formation. We have called this 
‘near-rational' behaviour. When the exchange rate is 
within the range S^. S,, in Appendix 4, the technical analysis 
ij u 
will dominate the expectations in the market� When however 
the exchange rate is driven outside this range and the 
exchange rate deviates sufficiently from the equilibrium 
卯 See De Grauwe (1983) for formulations of such 
rules. 
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level, the parameter k declines, thereby increasing the 
weight given to the forward-looking term in equation (2). 
In that case, the forward-looking rational expectations 
behaviour will tend to dominate the market's expectation. 
If the C^S are all zero, exchange rate follows a 
random walk.^^ Then equation (2) becomes 
= 0 (3) 
or 
二 St � 
This is because economic agents are uncertain about what 
the true equilibrium value is, they set the weight k equal 
to 1. In other words, if the exchange rate follows random 
walk, economic agents rely only on the present exchange 
rate to forecast the future. Any shock that triggers a 
change will lead to persistence. There is nothing to bring 
the exchange rate back to its initial level. There is also 
nothing that will prevent the exchange rate from wandering 
away aimlessly as long as it remains within the band of 
agnosticism. 
If the coefficients Cj are positive, initial shock 
which leads to a depreciation of the currency will lead 
31 Craig Hakkio showed that the Pound/dollar exchange 
rate follows a random walk during flexible exchange rate 
periods but not during fixed exchange rate periods. 
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to further depreciations in the future or vice versa. Then 
the backward-looking component extrapolates the past and 
the present rates of depreciation. The exchange rate will 
then be moving away from the equilibrium rate and will then 
surely tend to leave the range of agnosticism. At that 
point, the forward-looking component will become important 
again, driving down the exchange rate into that range. 
From then on the technical analysis leads to new 
'wanderings， of the exchange rate. 
In conclusion, in an uncertain environment, economic 
agents may prefer to use backward-looking rules for most of 
the time. It introduces conditions for long and protracted 
movements of the exchange rates away from their purchasing 
power parity values (PPP)• Once the spot exchange rate is 
pushed out of bounds, that is, the agnostic range, the 
estimates people make about the future equilibrium exchange 
rate become relevant for understanding today's exchange 
rate movements. Thus, the concept of near-rationality does 
not make economic models total irrelevant in forecasting 
future exchange rate movements. Rather it restricts their 
usefulness to a narrower range of situations. 
Test of Technical Analysis 
32 
The writer uses the Teletrac software to undertake 
trend analysis for the four major currencies in the last 
two years. The technical indicators used include moving 
averages. Oscillator and Relative Strength Index (RSI). 
]2 Teletrac is a product of the Telerate. 
� 
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Illustration for Technical Indicators 
Exchange Rate Change 
Day 0 1,6800 一 
Day 1 1.6850 +0.0050 
Day 2 1.7050 +0.0200 
Day 3 1.6980 -0.0070 
Day 4 1.7250 +0.0270 
Day 5 1.7330 +0.0080 
Day 6 1.7680 +0.0350 
Day 7 1.7575 -0.0105 
Day 8 1.7450 -0.0125 
On day 8, RSI, moving averages and oscillator are 
calculated as follows : 
9 days‘ up average (X) 
二 (0.0050 + 0.0200 + 0�0270 + 0.0080 + 0.0350) + 9 
=0.01056 
9 days‘ down average (Y) 
=(0.0070 + 0.0105 + 0.0125) + 9 
=0.0033 
9-day RSI 
=I X + Y J X 100 
= 0.01056 X 100 
0.01056 + 0.0033 
=76.19 
5-day moving average 
二 ( 1 . 7 4 5 0 + 1 . 7 5 7 5 + 1 . 7 6 8 0 + 1 . 6 3 3 0 + 1 . 7 2 5 0 ) + 5 
=1.7457 
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9-day moving average 
=(1.7450 + 1.7575 + 1.7680 + 1.7330 + 1.7250 + 1.6980 + 
1.7050 + 1.6850 + 1.6800) + 9 
=1.7218 
Oscillator of the pair of moving averages 
=1.7457 - 1.7218 
=0.0239 
Trading Rule 
The buy and sell signals are based on the simple rules as 
follows: 
Buy J If RSI >40 and RSI >previous RSI, and oscillator >0 
and oscillator >previous oscillator. 
Sell: If RSI <60 and RSI�previous RSI, and oscillator <0 
and oscillator �previous oscillator. 
The software can find the optimal pairs of moving averages 
based on historical exchange rates. The results were 




Assume we allocate a portfolio in 4 equal portions for the 
4 major currencies : 
u ？4 Currency Allocation Return 1990 Return 1989 
DEM 25% -3.51% +30.80% 
YEN 25% -3.65% +12.40% 
STG 25% +17.78% +7.37% 
SFR 25% +2.25% +13.83% 
Total 100% +3.22% +16.10% 
广, 
The study shows that technical analysis can deliver 
positive return. It is useful in hedging short term 
currency risk. The strength of this method is consistency 
and discipline. It will eliminate the inconsistency of 
human judgements caused by uncertainties. The technical 
indicators can act as anchors for forecasting future 
exchange rate direction when economic models predict mixed 
results. However, due to its backward-looking nature, the 
same moving average pairs cannot guarantee good results in 
the future. As in this case, the result of 1990 is worse 
than that of 1989 using the same parameters. Constant fine 
tuning is therefore necessary to improve predictive power. 
33 Please refer to Table 9 to Table 12 for return 
figures for respective currencies. Return figures do not 
consider carrying cost due to interest differential. 
34 Please refer to Table 9 to Table 12 for return 
figures for respective currencies. 
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The weakness of this method is the inability to 
predict the absolute level of exchange rate. For long term 
strategic planning that requires a forecast of long term 
exchange rate, this method would not be very useful. The 
statistical approach of this method is mechanical and not 
economically rational. From the previous model of exchange 
rate determination, if forward-looking factors push the 
exchange rate out of the band of agnosticism, this method 




Currency risk is more than incurring accounting loss 
due to exchange rate fluctuation. It can be business 
structural risk related to competitiveness and financial 
structural risk related to currency composition of cash 
flow. The prolonged weakness of Hong Kong dollar in the 
eighties has increased the competitiveness of Hong Kong. 
There is not much concern on business structural risk for 
exporters. For importers, price increase allowed by higher 
inflation level relieves part of the squeeze on profit 
margin. Currency risk management mainly deals with 
financial structural risk. The common method is short term 
hedging with forecast on exchange rate or solely risk 
elimination without a forecast. 
The currency risk of major currencies is in the order 
of single digit monthly percentage change with a maximum of 
nearly 5 percents. Annual change can vary widely ranging 
from single digit to double digits percentage change.^^ 
Correlations among currencies do not follow a stable 
pattern except that between Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc. 
^^See Appendix 5. 
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Besides, correlations have begun to decrease in the last 
two years. 
The method of technical analysis to forecast exchange 
rate direction has its value under a very uncertain world 
in which near-rationality is the behaviour in contrast to 
rationality under perfect information. Statistical 
approach of technical analysis aims at trend following 
rather than prediction of absolute exchange rate level. 
While economic models cannot provide consistent accurate 
predictions for short term variability of exchange rates, 
this method serves as an anchor for forecasting on short 
term basis. ’ 
Prospects in the Nineties 
After long period of weakness, the U.S. dollar will 
bottom out sooner or later as exchange rate adjustment is 
no longer the primary way to correct trade imbalance. Hong 
Kong exporters will have to deal with the business 
structural risk associated with a strong currency. 
Financial structural risk also increases with higher level 
of internationalization. Both risks are of recurring 
nature. The short term method will no longer be effective 
in controlling the risk. Recommendations are given under 
this context as follows : 
(1) Long term method to handle business structural risk 
is to maintain cost advantage and undergo 
technological change to enhance competitiveness. The 
economic integration with Guangdong province will 
provide the cost advantage. To utilize the cheap 
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labour and land cost in Mainland China will be one of 
the important way to deal with business structural 
risk while emphasis in technological change of 
production and management is also important to 
enhance competitiveness. 
(2) Long term method to deal with recurring financial 
structural risk involves the centralization of 
exposure management to lower cost of operation, to 
facilitate currency position netting and to decide on 
currency dominations for financing. The choice of 
currency for financing and billing should consider 
the risk of the currency dominated and try to 
minimize the net positions of risky currencies. 
(3) Firms have to define their business objectives 
clearly in considering the risk control function of 
treasury department. Unless the firms have 
comparative advantage in currency speculation, the 
risk involved is not ；justified to engage in such 
dealing. 
(4) The burden of exchange risk management must also fall 
on the shoulders of marketing and production 
executives. Marketing and production are the 
sections of the company with specialized knowledge to 
deal with market, product, customer and competition 
related to change in exchange rate. 
(5) For short terra hedging, technical analysis is one of 
the choice to forecast exchange rate movements due to 
its consistency and discipline nature. It should be 
noted that human judgements, which are always 
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influenced by shocks and uncertainties, are prone to 
inconsistency and undiscipline. 
(6) For protfolio management that is under constant 
pressure for short term performance, economic models 
cannot help to avoid the short term impacts of 
exchange rate variability on the values of carrying 
assets. Technical analysis may be more appropriate 
to manage short term currency risk. 
(7) Long term exchange rate forecast should consider the 
following facts : 
a) Purchasing Power Parity is an academic reference 
and exchange rate is not sticky to this value. 
b) Open interest parity does not hold due to the 
existence of risk premium. 
c) External value of domestic currencty is 
positively associated with real income growth 
and interest rate. 
d) Current account is not influential in 
determining exchange rate. 
(8) Future study on the usefulness of technical analysis 
on long term basis is worthwhile. 
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TABLE 1 
U.S. DOLLAR RISK 
DM/$ ¥/$ SF/$ 
1980 3.11 3.44 2.22 3.47 
1981 3.81 3.61 3.81 4.70 
1982 3.25 4.71 2.41 3.93 
1983 2.29 1.73 3.02 1.41 
1984 3.47 2.03 2.88 2.95 
1985 3.84 3.01 4,58 4.58 
Average 3.30 3.09 3.15 3.51 
1986 4,18 3.85 3.20 4.53 
1987 2.68 3.61 2.49 3.13 
1988 3,19 3.51 3.92 3.45 
1989 4.08 3.66 3.74 3.93 
1990 1.48 3.49 2.36 1.40 
Average 3.12 3.62 3.14 3.29 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from 




STERLING EXCHANGE RATES CORRELATIONS 
DM/$ and DM/$ and DM/$ and ¥N/$ and YN/$ and SF/$ and 
¥N/$ SF/$ SF/$ 
1980 0.24 0.59 0.95 0.31 0.42 0.58 
,1981 0.50 0.40 0.94 0,56 0.74 0.47 
1982 0.85 0.69 0.93 0.82 0.31 0.65 
1983 0.79 0.19 0.51 0.71 0.39 0.13 
1984 0.53 0.87 0.92 0.70 0.35 0.76 
1985 0.76 0.81 0.98 0.77 0.45 0.85 
Average 0.62 0.59 0.87 0.65 0.44 0.57 
1986 0.75 0.57 0.97 0.86 0.56 0.59 
1987 0.81 0.84 0.97 0.88 0.83 0.90 
1988 0.87 0.90 0.98 0.88 0.93 0.88 
1989 0.88 0.85 0.94 0.83 0.91 0.75 
1990 0.43 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.61 0.62 
Average 0.75 0.75 0.87 0.78 0.77 0.75 
Source: Monthly exchange rate are taken from Reuters. 




$/L m/h SF/h YN/L 
1980 2.22 2.57 2*86 3.20 
1981 3.70 4.04 4.29 2.44 
1982 2.32 2.29 2.96 4.40 
1983 3.09 3.53 3.08 2.84 
1984 2.88 1.65 2*00 2.79 
1985 4.92 2.81 2.60 4.43 
Average 3.19 2.82 2.97 3.35 
1986 3.21 3.52 3.68 3.29 
1987 2.58 1.51 1.42 2.14 
1988 3.88 1.78 1.83 1.44 
1989 3.73 2.18 2.63 1.56 
1990 2.46 1.99 1.88 2.83 
Average 3.17 2.20 2.29 2.25 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from 




STERLING EXCHANGE RATES CORRELATIONS 
DM/L and SF/L and and 
SF/L ¥N/L ¥N/L 
1980 0.93 0.09 0.20 
1981 0.92 0.42 0.37 
1982 0.87 0.83 0.17 
1983 0.65 0.92 0.81 
1984 0.70 0.76 0.76 
1985 0.90 0.72 0.79 
Average 0.83 0.64 0.52 
1986 0.95 0.78 0*30 
1987 0.83 0.57 -0.23 
1988 0.92 0.49 0.46 
1989 0.85 0.54 0.28 
1990 0.68 0.15 0.11 
Average 0.85 0.51 O.IS 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from Reuters. 




$/¥N L/YN DM/YN SF/YN 
1980 3.52 3.16 4.12 4.18 
1981 3.65 2.53 3.71 3.99 
1982 4.75 4.78 2.66 2,11 
1983 1.90 2.83 1.35 1.20 
1984 2.03 2.83 2.80 1.83 
1985 3.24 4.37 2.59 3.08 
Average 3.18 3.42 2.87 2.84 
1986 3.91 3.51 2.83 2.35 
1987 3,78 2.20 2.20 1.80 
1988 3.48 1.43 1.72 1.68 
1989 3�60 1.55 2.00 2.20 
1990 3.52 2.81 3.13 3.15 
Average 3.66 2.30 2.38 2.24 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from Reuters• 




YEN EXCHANGE RATES CORRELATIONS 
SF/¥N and DM/YN and SF/YN and 
DM/YN L/¥N h/YH 
1980 0.97 0.77 0.72 
1981 0 . 9 0 0 . 1 8 0.11 
1982 0.85 0.82 0.68 
1983 0.03 -0.28 -0.01 
1984 0.89 0.78 0.66 
1985 0.93 0.79 O.U 
Average 0.76 0.51 0.51 
1986 0.91 0.35 0.35 
1987 0.94 0.76 0.16 
1988 0.89 0.38 0.43 
1989 0.79 0.27 0.05 
1990 0.88 0.79 0.81 
Average 0.88 0.51 0.48 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from Reuters. 





$/DM L/DM SF/DM ¥N/DM 
1980 3.04 2.49 1.01 3.95 
1981 3.79 4.16 1.71 4.01 
1982 3.27 2.38 1�51 2.58 
1983 2.16 3.42 1.77 1�35 
1984 3.49 1.69 1.45 2.85 
1985 3.98 2.83 1.22 2.58 
Average 3.29 2.83 1.45 2.89 
1986 4.23 3.56 2.78 
1987 2.79 1.51 0.85 2.17 
1988 3.12 1.74 0.71 1.69 
1989 4.04 2.21 1.42 2.08 
1990 1.53 1.94 1.50 3.17 
Average 3.14 2.19 2.38 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from Reuters� 




SWISS FRANC RISKS 
$/SF L/SF DM/SF ¥N/SF 
1980 3.50 2.85 1*23 4.02 
1981 4.79 4.50 1.75 4.11 
1982 4,03 3.09 1.49 2.64 
1983 1.45 3.08 1*77 1.21 
1984 2.88 2.11 1.42 1.81 
1985 4.81 2.63 1.22 3.14 
Average 3.58 3.04 1.48 2.82 
1986 4.65 3.81 1.23 2.29 
1987 2.71 1.43 0.86 1.78 
1988 3.39 1.80 0.70 1.66 
1989 3.83 2.65 1.42 2.26 
1990 1.47 1.88 1.51 3. 16 
Average 3.21 2.31 1.14 2.23 
Source: Monthly exchange rates are taken from Reuters. 




DEUTSCHE MARK TRADING IN 1990 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) NOV 17 43,46 43.79 -0.0012 0.0030 REV L/S SELL $ 1.8410 0% 
(2) JAN 22 61.88 55.52 0.0100 0.0055 REV S/L BUY $ 1.7253 -2.02%* 
(3) JAN 29 38.93 43.57 -0.0066 0.0028 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6761 -4.89% 
(4) FEB 27 60,00 57.96 0.0038 -0,0004 REV S/L BUY $ 1,6905 -5.70% 
(5) APR 03 46.24 49.82 -0,0045 -0.0023 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6973 -5.33% 
(6) MAY 24 71.01 65.94 0�0057 -0,0025 REV S/L BUY $ 1.6864 -4.72% 
(7) JUN 21 44,34 45.52 -0.0068 -0.0029 REV. L/S SELL $ 1.6773 -5.23% 
(8) SEP 11 60.44 57.79 0.0036 0,0019 REV S/L BUY $ 1.5861 0% 
(9) SEP 27 45�64 47.16 -0.0013 0.0020 REV L/S SELL % 1.5615 -1.55% 
(10) NOV 29 67.17 52.22 0.0024 -0.0039 REV S/L BUY $ 1.5060 1.95% 
(11) DEC 12 41.09 43.03 -0.0060 -0.0019 REV L/S SELL $ 1.4755 0% 
(12) DEC 20 56.66 44.49 0.0002 -0.0046 REV S/L BUY $ 1.5100 -2.33% 
* Adjusted for 1989 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 5 days 1989 year end level : 1.6905 
iDOV-avg2 = 23 days 1990 year end level : 1.4920 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1.5100 
= { 1 - 0.9767 X [1 - (1.4920 - 1)]} x 100% 
=-3.51% 
Abbreviations : 
REV L/S reverse long US$ to short US$ 
REV S/L reverse short US$ to long US$ 
L/S long or short 
P/L profit or loss 
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TABLE 10 
JAPAKESE YEN TRADING IN 1990 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 18 44.34 54.65 -0.0258 0.1336 REV L/S SELL % 143.57 0% 
(2) I JAN 02 I 75.39 | 57.12 | 0.0521 |-0.1536 | REV S/L BUY $ 146.60 -1.88% * 
(3) I JAN 25 38.19 | 52.88 -0.0462 0.2824 REV L/S SELL $ 143.88 -3.73% 
(4) FEB 06 53.25 49.59 0�3608 0.1669 REV S/L BUY $ 145.23 -4.53% 
(5) I FEB 15 41,79 50.94 -0.4287 |-0.3694 | REV L/S SELL $ 144.04 -5.42% 
(6) FEB 21 58.73 54.78 0.0246 -0.1523 REV S/L BUY $ 145.55 -6.40% 
(7) I APR 10 I 57.63 | 61.19 | -0.2159 |-0.2952 | REV L/S SELL $ 157.75 -0.84% 
(8) I APR 17 I 69.76 | 66.98 | 0.2668 |-0.0954 | REV S/L BUY $ 159.87 -0.50% 
(9) MAY 07 48.54 49.84 -0.3083 -0.1134 REV L/S SELL J 158.17 -1.57% 
(10) JUN 04 48.96 46.94 0.5003 -0.2283 REV S/L BUY $ 152.23 2.13% 
(11) JUN 29 34.57 39.91 -0.14 0.19 REV L/S SELL % 152.16 2.08% 
(12) I JUL 24 I 44.39 | 38.16 | 0.16 卜0.22 | REV S/L | BUY $ 148.73 4.38% 
(13) AUG 03 I 53.64 53.95 -0.61 -0.57 REV L/S SELL $ 149.35 4.82% 
(14) I AUG 07 I 62.09 | 58.65 | 0.47 丨-0.32 REV S/L BUY $ 151.16 3.55% 
(15) AUG 15 39.25 43.01 -0.17 | 0.45 REV L/S SELL $ 147.65 1.15% 
(16) I SEP 28 I 48.63 | 46.56 | 0.17 |-0.03 | REV S/L | BUY $ 138.52 7.40% 
(17) I OCT 04 I 24.85 | 33.55 | -0.51 | 0.05 | REV L/S | SELL $ 133.76 3.71% 
(18) I OCT 29 I 48.17 | 45.09 | 1,08 | 0.56 | REV S/L BUY $ 128.70 7.63% 
(19) I NOV 21 I 38.38 48.74 | -0.31 -0.02 REV L/S SELL $ 127.11 -6.30% 
(20) NOV 29 71.48 61.05 0.64 -0.24 REV S/L BUY $ 133.45 -1.00% 
(21) DEC 12 50.46 55.30 -0.65 0.06 REV L/S SELL % 131.32 -0.61% 
(22) DEC 19 62-42 54.46 0.49 0.06 REV S/L BUY $ 134.05 -2.68% 
I I 1 I I 1 1 i I 1 1 
* Adjusted for 1989 year and valuation. 
roov-avg = 5 days 1989 year end level : 143.85 
inov-avg2 = 11 days 1990 year end level : 135.40 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
134.05 




STERLING POUND TRADING IN 1990 
CONDITIOHS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 08 62.79 57.16 0.0010 -0�0026 REV S/L BUY STG 1.5835 0% 
(2) MAR 01 28.37 34.51 -0.0053 0,0047 REV L/S SELL STG 1.6640 3.32%* 
(3) APR 03 55.28 53,52 0.0092 0.0048 REV S/L BUY STG 1.6362 5,05% 
(4) MAY 02 55.28 59.52 -0.0000 0.0001 REV L/S SELL STG 1.6417 5.40% 
(5) MAY 04 71.85 50.90 0.0060 0.0011 REV S/L BUY STG 1.6630 4.03% 
(5) SEP 07 45.06 53.28 -0.0132 -0.0121 REV L/S SELL STG 1.8920 18.36% 
(7) OCT 03 58.69 55.54 0�0023 -0.0049 REV S/L BUY STG 1.9017 17.75% 
(8) DEC 03 25.43 35.81 -0.0102 -0.0012 REV L/S SELL STG 1.9178 18.75% 
* Adjusted for 1989 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 5 days 1989 year end level : 1.6105 
inov-avg2 = 23 days 1990 year end level : 1.9335 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1.9335 




SWISS FRANC TRADING IN 1990 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
2BEV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) NOV 24 39.73 43.67 -0.0012 0.0023 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6095 0% 
(2) MAR 06 55.3032 51.9303 0.0097 0.0075 REV S/L BUY $ 1-5003 2.78%* 
(3) APR 05 42.0904 46.5174 -0.0107 -0,0078 REV L/S SELL $ 1.5005 2,79% 
(4) may 30 50.7700 39.8800 0.0003 -0.0021 REV S/L BUY $ 1-4225 8.13% 
(5) JUN 19 35.68 38.41 -0�0003 0.0048 REV L/S SELL $ 1.4108 7.24% 
(6) JUL 18 55,79 49.73 0.0006 -0.0045 REV S/L BUY $ 1.4153 7.58% 
(7) JUL 24 35.70 37.68 -0.0039 0.0016 REV L/S SELL $ 1.3777 24.72% 
(8) SEP 06 46.08 45.74 0.0030 -0.0002 REV S/L BUY $ 1.2965 10.89% 
(9) OCT 02 40.85 46.47 -0.0071 -0.0057 REV L/S SELL $ 1.2872 10.09% 
(10) OCT 29 57.24 49.09 0.0002 -0.0045 REV S/L BUY $ 1.2931 9.59% 
(11) NOV 05 33.59 38.15 -0.0032 0.0002 REV L/S SELL $ 1.2505 5.98% 
(12) NOV 29 73.01 65.27 0.0065 -0.0000 REV S/L BUY $ 1.2835 3.18% 
* Adjusted for 1989 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 6 days 1989 year end level : 1.5420 
iBov-avg2 = 23 days 1990 year end level : 1.2720 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1.2835 




DEUTSCHE MARK TRADING IN 1989 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 12 51.48 49.17 0.0113 0.0062 REV S/L BUY $ 1.7415 0% 
(2) FEB 15 41.22 42.19 -0.0044 0.0012 REV L/S SELL $ 1.8420 3.91%* 
(3) MAR 08 66.84 60.31 0.0058 -0.0002 REV S/L BUY $ 1.8642 2.67% 
(4) APR 14 38.50 44.60 -0.0040 0.0025 REV L/S SELL $ 1.8635 2.53% 
(5) APR 28 62.06 58.83 0.0083 -0.0068 REV S/L BUY $ 1.8820 1.62% 
(6) JUL 21 40.08 50.46 -0.0119 0.0023 REV L/S SELL % 1.9592 5.62% 
(7) AUG 09 52.00 50.95 0.0083 0.0018 REV S/L BUY $ 1.8952 9.19% 
(8) SEP 20 36.24 42.72 -0.0005 -0�0030 REV L/S SELL $ 1.9408 13.78% 
(9) NOV 15 42.40 39.90 0.0040 0.0039 REV S/L BUY $ 1.8397 20.03% 
(10) NOV 17 43.46 43.79 -0.0012 0,0030 REV L/S SELL $ 1.8410 20.11% 
* Adjusted for 1988 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 6 days 1988 year end level : 1.7700 
iDOv-avg2 = 23 days 1989 year end level : 1.6905 
KSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1.8410 
=[1.2011 X (1.6905) - 1] X 100% 
=30.80% 
Profit and Loss on compound basis. 
I 番 遲 中 文 大 學 B 翥 代 我 書 I 
64 
TABLE 14 
JAPANESE YEN TRADING IN 1989 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL Z/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 06 46.63 40.43 0.0594 0.0365 REV S/L 3UY $ 121.97 0% 
(2) FEB 09 I 42.24 | 62.47 | -0.2192 | 0.1545 | REV L/S | SELL $ 128.00 2.38% * 
(3) FEB 27 47.07 | 36.89 0.0317 -0.2210 REV S/1 30Y $ 126.82 3.33% 
(4) I APR 18 I 42.41 | 51.49 | -0.0659 | 0.1756 REV L/S SELL $ 131.37 6,91% 
(5) APR 28 I 63.66 | 54.19 | 0.1425 |-0.0766 | REV SjTL | 皿 $ 133.07 5.54% 
(6) I JUN 21 I 42.15 I 53.75 | -1.0616 | 0.3548 | REV L/S 3SLL $ 142.35 12.42% 
(7) JUN 30 I 55.23 | 54.42 | 0.2432 |-1.0095 | REV S/X \ SOY $ 144.10 ll�-05% 
(8) JUL 27 38.10 41.39 -0.0928 0.2908 REV L/S SELL $ 139.20 7.14% 
(9) AUG 09 I 48.02 | 45.81 | 0.5541 |-0.1301 | REV S/I, | SOY $ 139.00 7.29% 
(10) I SEP 18 I 51.69 I 57.79 | -0.0121 | 0.1153 | REV L/S SELL $ 145.79 12.29% 
(11) I OCT 09 I 50.48 | 48.41 | 0.7510 |-0.1369 | REV S/"L 2DY % 142.68 14.76% 
(12) OCT 18 41.79 48.40 -0�3020 0.2961 REV L/S £SLL$ 141.55 13.82% 
(13) I OCT 31 I 56.10 I 47.25 | 0.0000 |-0.2377 | REV S/X 2UY % 142.85 12.78% 
(14) NOV 24 I 50.85 57.40 -0.0080 0.1911 REV L/S SELL % 143.60 13.37% 
(15) DEC 06 59.73 55.55 0.0886 -0.0980 REV S/Z. SOY $ 144.06 13.01* 
(16) DEC 18 44.34 54.65 | -0.0258 0.1336 REV L/S SELL % 143.57 12.62% 
I I 1 I I I ！ I i i 1 
* Adjusted for 1988 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 5 days 1988 year end level : 124.95 
inov-avg2 = 11 days 1989 year end level i 143.85 
BSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
143.57 
=[1.1262 X (143.85) - 1] x 100% 
=12.40% 
Profit and Loss on compound basis. 
65 
TABLE 10 
STERLING POUND TBADING IN 1989 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTION REALIZED 
PKEV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 15 39.95 44.61 -0.0054 0,0027 REV L/S SELL STG 1.8192 0% 
(2) FEB 17 60.71 I 58.49 0.0099 0.0047 REV S/L BUY STG 1.7750 2.04% * 
(3) FEB 24 47.39 I 48.15 -0.0022 0.0006 REV L/S SELL STG 1.7565 0.97% 
(4) APR 18 63.23 61.49 0.0000 -0.0058 REV S/L BUY STG 1.7157 3.32% 
(5) APR 28 32.48 35.77 -0.0045 -0.0004 REV L/S SELL STG 1.5865 1.56% 
(6) I JUL 03 I 58.93 | 48.51 | 0.0021 |-0.0042 | REV S/L BUY STG 1.5775 8.12% 
(7) AUG 09 47.34 48.67 | -0.0126 -0.0062 REV L/S SELL STG 1.6225 U . 20% 
(8) I SEP 20 I 62.86 | 56.04 | 0.0055 | 0.0008 | REV S/L BUY STG 1.5820 13,96% 
(9) OCT 11 29.26 31.31 -0.0019 0.0088 REV L/S SELL STG 1.5478 11.50% 
(10) OCT 23 58.57 52-18 0.0008 -0.0032 REV S/L BUY STG 1.6025 7.56% 
(11) OCT 31 46.52 47.59 -0.0046 -0.0011 REV L/S SELL STG 1.5810 6.10% 
(12) I NOV 13 I 50.05 | 45.48 | 0.0025 | 0.0018 | REV S/L |BUY STG 1.5822 6.02% 
(13) I NOV 15 47.49 57.91 -0.0006 0�0026 REV L/S SELL STG 1.5795 5.84% 
(14) I DEC 08 I 62.79 | 57.16 | 0.0010 |-0.0026 | REV L/S BUY STG 1.5835 5.57% 
I I I I I ！ 1 I I 1 ！ 
* Adjusted for 1988 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 5 days 1988 year end level ； 1.8120 
roov-avg2 = 11 days 1989 year end level : 1.6105 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1.6105 
=[1.0557 X (1.5835) - 1] x 100% 
=7.37% 
Profit and Loss on compound basis. 
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TABLE 16 
SWISS FRANC TRADING IN 1989 
CONDITIONS 
(1) (2) ACTIOI? REALIZED 
PREV. PREV. DONE CUMULATIVE 
TRADE DATE RSI RSI OSCL OSCL SIGNAL L/S LEVEL P/L 
(1) DEC 12 53.94 53.33 0.0090 0.0041 REV S/L BUY $ 1.4655 0% 
(2) FBE 15 41.01 41.30 -0.0028 0.0012 REV L/S SELL % 1.5629 1.34%* 
(3) MAR 08 67.04 61.92 0,0086 0.0023 REV S/L BUY $ 1.5920 0.51% 
(4) APR 20 42.66 45.80 -0.0052 0.0015 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6295 1-78% 
(5) APR 28 72.22 64,22 0.0044 -0.0024 REV S/L BUY $ 1.6767 1^09% 
(6) JUN 01 37.74 41.70 -0.0006 0.0135 REV L/S SELL $ 1.7010 0.32% 
(7) AUG 10 55.75 52.45 0.0053 -0.0001 REV S/L BUY $ 1.6405 4.02% 
(8) SEP 20 41.36 46.49 -0.0036 0.0015 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6825 6,62% 
(9) NOV 15 50.86 45.31 0.0078 0.0055 REV S/L BUY $ 1.6270 10,26% 
(10) NOV 24 39.73 43.57 -0.0012 0.0023 REV L/S SELL $ 1.6095 9.06% 
* Adjusted for 1988 year end valuation. 
mov-avg = 6 days 1988 year end level : 1.4985 
iDov-avg2 = 23 days 1989 year end level : 1.5420 
RSI = 9 days 
Total return = Total realized + Total unrealized P/L 
1,6095 




In Billions of U.S. Dollar March 1980 April 1983 
Type of Transaction 90 Banks 119 Banks 
Spot 300.4 399.2 
Swaps 137.8 204.4 
Outright Forwards 11,6 11 “ 
Grand Total 449.7 615.0 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Foreign 
Exchange Turnover Survey (March 1980 and April 1983) 
Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals. 
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APPENDIX 2 
March 1980 April 1983 
r u Other pther:___ F r e n c h ^ F r e n c ^ 1 
Swiss I \ 
V^-jy^und / ‘ \^ound / J a p a n e s e ^ W 
\ Sterling Xven / \ Sterling / Yen J 
\ 22.8$ \ I 6 . 6 $ / 22 . 055 / 
- 广 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TURNOVER BY CURRENCY 
Source: Data based on Federal Bank of New York‘s 
Foreign Exchange- Turnover Surveys (March 1980 and April . 
1983)� 




HONG KONG DOLLAR FLUNCTUATION 
Year Closing Rate % Change 
Dec 79 4 .9250 "" 
Dec 80 5.1420 -4.22% 
Dec 81 5.7010 -9.81% 
Dec 82 6.4700 -11.89% 
Dec 83 7.7810 -16.85% 
Source: Bank of America ’ 
APPENDIX 4 
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ANNUAL CHANGE OF SELECTED DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES 
Year DM/US$ % Change Yen/US$ % Change 
1980 1.9590 - 203.25 -
1981 2.2625 +15.5% 219.40 +8.0% 
1982 2.3652 +4.5% 232.50 +6.0% 
1983 2.7250 +15.2% 231.85 一 0 * 3 % 
1984 3.1770 +16.6% 251.95 +8.7% 
1985 2.4410 -23.2% 200.05 -20.6% 
1986 1.9200 -21.3% 158.05 -21.0% 
1987 1.5705 -18.2% 121.10 ~23.4% 
1988 1.7700 +12.7% 124.95 +3.2% 
1989 1.6905 -4.5% 143.85 +15.1% 
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